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Abstract
An interlocking system monitors the status of the objects in a railway yard,
allowing or denying the movement of trains, in accordance with safety rules.
The high number of complex interlocking rules that guarantee the safe move-
ments of independent trains in a large station makes the verification of such
systems a complex task, which needs to be addressed in conformance with
EN50128 safety guidelines.
In this paper we show how the problem has been addressed by a manu-
facturer at the final validation stage of production interlocking systems, by
means of a model extraction procedure that creates a model of the internal
behaviour, to be exercised with the planned test suites, in order to reduce
the high costs of direct validation of the target system.
The same extracted model is then subject to formal verification experi-
ments, employing an iterative verification process implementing slicing and
CEGAR-like techniques, defined to address the typical complexity of this
application domain.
Keywords: Railway Interlocking Systems, System Validation, Model-based
Testing, Formal Methods, Model Checking
1. Introduction
Among railway signalling systems, the interlocking systems are respon-
sible of allowing or denying, according to established safety and operational
regulations, the routing of the trains through stations or railway yards. Safety
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and operational regulations are generic for the region or country where the
interlocking is located, and their instantiation on a particular station or yard
topology is usually captured by a so called control table. Control tables of
modern computer-based interlocking systems are implemented by means of
iteratively executed software tests over the status of the yard objects.
One of the most common ways to describe the interlocking rules given by
control tables is through boolean equations or, equivalently, ladder diagrams
which are interpreted either by a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) or
by a proper evaluation engine over a standard processor.
In particular, in (7), we have introduced an effort made in a cooperation
between the University of Florence and the Safety and Validation (S&V)
team of General Electric Transportation Systems (GETS) in Florence, with
the final aim of reducing the costs of verifying the safety requirements of the
produced interlocking systems, in the system validation phase.
The S&V team performs the final independent validation, according to
CENELEC EN50128 standard (9), of the produced railway signalling sys-
tems, and hence it acts as an independent verifier of the interlocking systems
produced by other branches of the company, with little insight of the followed
development process, and focusing on the final product.
According to the separation between design teams and validation teams,
the information accompanying a system that undergoes validation is con-
stituted solely by the controlled station layout, and by a set of test suites
defined by the signalling engineers for that particular system.
To gain more insight over the control tables encoded within the system
under evaluation, it is possible to extract those control tables by means of
proprietary procedures (called in the following legacy libraries) that provide
the control tables in a proprietary format. For confidentiality reasons, the
format cannot be disclosed, nor any fragment of extracted control tables.
Hence, the scope of our work is the modelling of the control tables ex-
tracted from the binary files, by means of a reverse engineering process, in
order for the tests suites to be simulated on the model; the expected advan-
tages are expected to be given by the early validation of the implemented
control tables, before a full physical test bench for the specific equipment is
built.
The choice of the modelling tool was taken according to specific con-
straints posed by the S&V team: in order to smoothly adopt this verifica-
tion technique inside the internal production process, a commercial devel-
opment/verification tool, already known within the company, was a require-
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ment. This constraint has favoured the choice of Matlab and Simulink, using
Simulink logic gates to encode boolean functions extracted from the legacy
control tables.
Moreover, in (6) we set up a verification framework based on model check-
ing on the extracted model, employing Matlab Design Verifier (33), both
because it works on Simulink models and to exploit at best its SAT-solving
capabilities on the native boolean coding of the control tables. The verifi-
cation framework exploits environment abstraction, slicing and CEGAR-like
techniques, driven by the detailed knowledge of the interlocking product un-
der verification.
The paper extends results from (5; 6; 7), which separately described the
preliminary application of the proposed model-based testing and formal veri-
fication concepts. The two concepts are now jointly presented in an improved
way, with more up-to-date details, reporting also how the former is already
consolidated into the industrial validation procedure, while the latter is still
at an experimental stage.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the current activity
of system testing in the S&V Laboratory of GETS, placing it in the con-
text of the overall development cycle of safety critical systems in accordance
with EN50128. In Section 3 we introduce Ladder Logic, which is used to
implement control tables, and we introduce the model extraction process
that allows the control tables to be translated into boolean functions imple-
mented in a Simulink model. Section 4 introduces the testing made on the
extracted models, showing the results obtained when three example inter-
locking systems are simulated with given simulation scenarios. In Section 5
we address formal verification discussing in particular the proposed slicing
and abstraction techniques. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The role of validation in EN50128
CENELEC EN50128 is the standard that specifies the procedures and
the technical requirements for the development of programmable electronic
devices to be used in railway control and signalling protection (9). This
standard is part of a family, and it refers only to the software components
and to their interaction with the whole system. The basic concept of the
standard is the SIL (Safety Integrity Level). Integrity levels characterize
software modules and functions according to their criticality, and range is
defined from 0 to 4, where 0 is the lowest level, which refers to software
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functions for which a failure has no safety effects and 4 is the maximum
level, for which a software failure can have severe effects on the safety of
system, resulting in possible loss of human life.
2.1. Model-based design
The standard encourages the usage of models and formal methods in every
phase of the development cycle for software of the highest SILs, starting from
the design to the verification. The rationale is that models are more related
to abstract concepts than the technologies used for their implementation into
code, and are therefore closer to the domain of the problem. On the other
hand, sufficiently detailed models can be used for automatic generation of
code: automatic code generation, according to EN50128, requires that the
code generator itself is somehow trusted.
In the past years GETS has committed to model-based design, by devel-
oping an internal software production process compliant with EN50128, em-
ploying the most advanced software production and verification techniques,
such as formal methods, model-based design and testing, automatic code
generation (15), static analysis based on abstract interpretation (16). Sev-
eral insights into this process can be retrieved in (2); such a process includes
a thorough verification activity on software units (16).
2.2. Independent validation
The EN50128 standard proposes three kinds of preferred organizational
structures, according to the SIL, for the software development.
The eight roles (Project Manager, Requirement Manager, Designer, Im-
plementer, Integrator, Tester, Verifier and Validator), defined by the stan-
dard for SIL3 and SIL4 software (to which we are interested in this context),
should be fulfilled by at least five persons, in the same company, who shall
(solid line) or can (dotted line) report their activity to the Project Manager
(see Figure 1).
The Validator (VAL) shall not report to the Project Manager but informs
him about his activity. Finally, the Assessor (ASR) is an independent entity
that carries out the process of the analysis to determine whether the software
meets the specified requirements and is fit for its intended purpose.
Note that the Verifier (VER) is part of the design and development team,
and performs early verification tasks (including e.g. unit testing and struc-
tural testing). Validation is instead intended as conducted on the final prod-
ucts, by means of system testing, functional testing and black-box testing,
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Figure 1: Roles in a company for SIL3 and SIL4 software
or so-called hardware-in-the-loop testing (8) of the actual installation. In
accordance with EN50128, the S&V team of GETS acts as the Validator en-
tity with the responsibility to carry out the validation testing of the railway
signalling equipment produced by the different development teams of GETS.
2.3. Certification of specific applications
The EN50128 guidelines distinguish between generic applications and spe-
cific applications, defining generic software as “software which can be used for
a variety of installations purely by the provision of application-specific data
and/or algorithms”. A Specific Application Software is defined as a Generic
Application Software plus configuration data, or plus specific algorithms.
These definitions clearly apply to interlocking systems: control tables act as
configuration data (since they could be expressed as Ladder Logic programs,
as seen in Sect. 3.1, they can be seen as specific algorithms as well).
EN50128 defines requirements about the validation of generic and spe-
cific applications. For example, “Care must be taken in the verification and
validation phases of the generic software in order to assure that all relevant
combinations of data and algorithms are considered. If all relevant combi-
nations of data and algorithms have not been considered, it shall be clearly
identified as a limit of use of the generic software”. For what concerns a
specific application, evidence is requested that the application conditions
of the generic application are met by the configuration data or the specific
algorithms.
Despite various “shortcuts” being provided, the certification of a specific
application, the application of which has already been certified as generic,
requires only a little less effort than the certification of an ad hoc application.
This means that the validation of any new installation of an interlocking
system needs all the validation effort to be repeated on that installation,
although it can focus on the correctness of control tables, assuming that the
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generic characteristic of the interlocking system have been already validated
for previous installations.
The hardware-in-the-loop testing requires lengthy scenarios to be run on
the actual installation reproduced in the validation labs, and this must be re-
peated for different installations of the same system, since the control tables
are different for each station. This makes validation a lengthy and costly pro-
cess. In the following sections we investigate model-based validation methods
that allow time and cost to be spared, by focusing on the specific source of
differences between interlocking installations, that is, control tables.
According to CENELEC guidelines, this corresponds to concentrating on
the validation of the configuration data of a specific applications rather than
on the generic application (that is, the control table evaluation engine) which
is taken as already validated.
3. Model Extraction
3.1. Ladder Logic Diagrams
In legacy relay-based interlocking systems, still operating in several sites,
the logical rules of the control tables were implemented by means of physical
relay connections. With modern computer-based interlocking systems, in ap-
plication since 30 years, the control table becomes a set of software equations
that are executed by the interlocking1. Since the signalling regulations of the
various countries were already defined in graphical form for the relay-based
interlocking systems, and also in order to facilitate the representation of con-
trol tables by signalling engineers, the design of computer-based interlocking
systems has usually adopted traditional graphical representations such as
Ladder Logic Diagrams (LLD) (27) and relay diagrams (21). These graph-
ical schemata, also called principle schemata, are instantiated on a station
topology to build the control table, which is then translated into a program
for the interlocking.
Correctness of control tables depends also on the model of execution by
the interlocking software. In building computer-based interlocking systems,
the manufacturers adopt the principle of as safe as the relay-based equipment
1Indeed, we should rather talk about “assignment of boolean expressions to boolean
variables” instead of “equations”. However, the syntactic appearance as an equation
system has favoured the common adoption of the latter term in the railway signaling
community, and we therefore adopt this term consistently throughout the paper.
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(35), and often the implemented model of execution is very close to the
hardware behaviour of the latter.
Ladder logic is a graphical language which can represent a set of boolean
equations and their execution order (control cycle). The control cycle can be
detailed as the following equation system:
x˜ = f(x˜, y˜)
where x˜, y˜ are boolean variable vectors representing respectively state/output
variables and input variables: these equations are sequentially and cyclically
executed, where for “execution of an equation” we intend the assignment to
its left hand of the evaluation of the right hand expression.
Ladder Logic represents the working of relay-based control systems. For
this reason the variables on the right-hand side of the equation are also named
contacts, while the variables in the left hand are named coils. Variables can
be distinguished in:
• Input variables : the value is assigned by sensor readings or operator
commands. These variables are defined in the expressions and cannot
be used as coil.
• Output variables : can only be coils and their value is determined by
means of the assignments of the diagram and is delivered to actuators.
• Latch variables : the value is calculated by means of the assignments,
but is used only for internal computation of the values of other vari-
ables. A latch variable is used as coil in an assignment and as an input
variable in other assignments.
With these three kinds of variables, a Ladder Logic Diagram (for short, a
ladder diagram) describes a state machine whose memory is represented by
the latch variables and whose evolution is described by the equations. An
execution cycle of this state machine, named control cycle, involves:
1. Reading input variables; the values of these variables are assumed to
be constant for the entire duration of the control cycle.
2. Computing each equation, in sequence, hence assigning values to the
output variables and to the latch variables as a function of the cur-
rent values of the input variables and the values of the latch variables
computed by the previous control cycle.
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3. Transmission of the values of the output variables.
In this way, the equations can be seen as interpreted by a reasoner engine.
The reasoner engine is the same for every station plan, and hence it con-
stitutes the generic application according to EN50128; the control table is
coded as configuration data, actually boolean equations, for the reasoner.
This approach is also referred as “data-driven”. Behind this choice is the
minimization of certification efforts: the reasoner is certified once for all, the
data are considered “easier” to certify if they can be related in some way to
the standard principle schemata adopted by railway engineers in the era of
relay-based interlocking systems.
Ladder diagrams have a text-only syntax, where, if x is a boolean variable,
an expression e can be defined as:
• “--] [--” represents the reference to a variable.
• “--]/ [--” represents the negation of a variable.
• “--( )” represents a coil.
• To mimic a logical and two variables are wired in series.
• To mimic a logical or two variables are wired in parallel.
Fig. 2 shows an example of ladder diagram according to such syntax.
Figure 2: Equation y = x ∧ (w ∨ ∼ z) as a ladder diagram
3.2. Model extraction process
The ladder diagram description of control tables is stored in the imple-
mented system, so we had first to define a process that allows a model of a
station to be obtained from the analysed implementation in two steps (see
Figure 3):
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1. Import Station Data: all data about a station (equations, timers,
interfaces, . . . ) are imported in Matlab by means of proprietary legacy
libraries that read the binary files loaded on the interlocking system.
2. Model Station Data: the equations are modelled in a Simulink model
by means of a tool named LLD-Parser (7).
Figure 3: Model extraction process
3.3. Importing Station Data
In order to extract the information from the binary files, we use those
proprietary interpretation routines that we have called legacy libraries. These
libraries allow to read each boolean equation, written as a ladder diagram,
as a matrix Mn×k. The values in the matrix can be either positive integers,
representing variables identifiers, or negative integers, representing either a
connector or the polarity, asserted or negated, of a variable (see Table 1).
The ladder diagram in Figure 2 is for example encoded by the following
matrix M : 
−40 100 −40 200 −40 500
−50 −10 −4 −20 −4 −30
−40 −40 −70 300 −70 −40
−40 −40 −1 −10 −2 −40

The values 100, 200, 300 and 500 are respectively associated to the variables
x, z, w and y.
3.4. LLD Parser
The extracted matrix, that represents a single equation, needs to be in-
terpreted in order to define the boolean function it implements, expressed in
a format suitable for Design Verifier.
9
Table 1: Symbol Translation
Symbol Value Symbol Value
b -1 −− [ ]−− -10
c -2 −− [/ ]−− -20
⊥ -3 −− ( ) -30
> -4 Blank space -40
` -5 Horizontal
line
-50
a -6 Vertical Line -70
+ -7
We have hence designed an algorithm, sketched in Algorithm 1, that
translates the matrix into a Simulink boolean function expressed as a com-
bination of logic gates.
Algorithm 1 LLD Parser
Require: Mn×k equation matrix
Ensure: Model of the equation
1: var ← GetVariables(M)
2: if > ∈M then
3: LogicAnd(M, var)
4: for i = 1 to k do
5: LogicOr(M, var, i)
6: LogicAnd(M, var)
7: end for
8: else
9: LogicAnd(M, var)
10: end if
If we focus on the graphical format of ladder diagram, we recognize one
or more connectors which belong to the following set:
C = {b c ⊥ > ` a +}
Considering specific pairs of connectors, in the set C, it is possible to define
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a connection relation (CR) between them: each pair in the relation indicates
the closing of a disjunction if found in the same line of a ladder diagram.
CR = {(b, c), (⊥, c), (b,⊥)}
The algorithm uses two auxiliary functions, namely LogicAnd, which
navigates the main line of the ladder diagram grouping from right to left the
consecutive contacts in a single and gate (see the example in Figure 4), and
LogicOr, which builds an or gate from the contacts that are found inside a
CR pair.
Following the algorithm, the variables are extracted first from the matrix
by the GetVariables function (line 1).
Then, the algorithm checks if the value corresponding to the symbol > is
present in the equation matrix M (line 2); this means that at least a logic
or is present in the ladder diagram.
If the symbol > is present the LogicAnd function is called to build the
and gates from consecutive contacts on the main line of the ladder diagram
(line 3).
Then, the algorithm executes the main loop (lines 4-7) in search of dis-
junctions from right to left, inside a window of increasing size i, by repeated
calls to LogicOr. In each cycle, the LogicAnd function groups again the left
consecutive conjunctions.
In the case the symbol > is not present, all the variables are in a logic
and and the corresponding gate is built by a single call to LogicAnd (line
9).
The LLD Parser builds a combinatorial logic network that represents the
right hand expression of an equation. Depending on the kind of coil used as
a left-hand, different uses are made of the output result of the network. In
particular, it may be used as:
• input to another equation
• input to the same equation
• activation of a timer
In the first case a connection with the related input to the model of the
other equation is made; in the second case a delay block is inserted in the
connection back to the input; in the latter case a timer is inserted (see Figure
5). This is done for all the models generated for the equations, completing
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Figure 4: Model building steps
the model of a station. The model extraction procedure has been applied to
equipments containing up to 12500 equations with 800 input variables. This
means that the produced Simulink models are very intricate and actually not
human-readable.
3.5. Use of the model - Safety requirements
The safety requirements for an interlocking system are normally expressed
in terms of routes, since the aim of an interlocking is to establish safe routes
through the track layout of a station. A route is intended as a set of con-
secutive track elements (track circuits, points, etc.) that have to be reserved
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Figure 5: Example of station model
together to allow for the movement of a train through the route. In general,
routes can be classified in main routes and shunting routes, protected by
different signals and with different interlocking rules; we do not apply this
distinction in the following. Typical safety requirements can be classified in
a few classes as:
• Route protection When a route is reserved for a train, appropriate
means are in place to prevent another train to enter the route.
This requirement may be enforced by the use of different mechanisms:
– Entry Signals : the aspect of an entry signal tells the driver whether
the train is authorized to enter a route;
– Speed Signals : the aspect of a speed signal tells the maximal speed
at which the train is authorized to enter a route;
– Automatic Train Protection: an on-board system receives the
movement authority from the interlocking and automatically brakes
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the train in case of missing authority
– Overlap: a safety zone of a certain distance after the route exit
signal, used to prevent a hazardous situation from occurring if a
train is unable to stop in front of the exit signal;
– Flank Protection: points and signals not belonging to the route
are properly set in order to avoid hostile train movements into the
route.
For example, in the simplest case where only the first item applies, this
requirement can be expressed as:
1. an entry signal to a route can be green only if a route protected by
the signal is reserved ;
2. (to avoid unintended movement of a following train) a green entry
signal shall be set to red as soon as a train has entered the reserved
route.
These requirements should be fulfilled for every route with its protect-
ing signal (note that one signal may in general protect more than one
route)
• No-collision
Once route protection is established, two trains cannot collide if the
following holds:
3. Two routes that share a track element cannot both be reserved at
the same time.
This requirement should be fulfilled for every pair of conflicting routes
(that is, routes that share a track element)
• No-derailment While a train is crossing a point, the point shall not
change its position.
Due to route protection, this requirement can be expressed as:
4. While a route is reserved, any point on the route shall not change
its position.
This requirement should be fulfilled for every pair of route and point
on the route.
14
• Cancellation and release Cancellation of a reserved route occurs at
a specific request from the operator. Release of the free track elements
of a route occurs after the train occupying the route track elements,
a connected group of elements or a complete route, has moved out of
them. To avoid collisions after a cancellation or release, the following
requirements shall be satisfied:
5. Cancellation of a route can occur only if no train has yet entered
the route, (that is, no track element of the route is occupied)
6. Release of track elements can occur only after the train has left
the track elements.
We can see that the generic safety requirements refer to specific layout of
physical or logical entities (points, track circuits, signals, routes,...). Hence
expressing actual safety requirements needs a detailed knowledge of the track
layout and of the interlocking rules actually applied.
The model extraction process presented in Sect. 3.2 is actually a reverse
engineering process, in which some domain knowledge is needed to relate
the variables used in the equations to the controlled track layout. Due to
independence constraints between the validation team and the design team,
this knowledge is however not always readily available. One piece of knowl-
edge available to the S&V team is the following convention for the vari-
ables’identifiers:
• the identifiers unambiguously indicate the kind of element to which the
variable refers;
• each variable identifier refers either to a specific track layout element
(track circuit, point, etc.) or to a specific route request:
– in the former case the identifier includes the number of the referred
track element;
– in the latter case the identifier includes a number that identifies
the route.
Adjacency of layout elements is inferred from the equations, rather than
known in advance: the relation between the numbers contained in the iden-
tifiers and the position of the named elements in the track layout is only par-
tially known, but it could be in principle retrieved from the equations using
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the above assumptions. For example, an equation used to set the reservation
of a route will have in its right hand (possibly transitively through other
equations) variables related to the status of all the adjacent elements that
belong to the route.
Actually, for verification purposes, it is not needed to fully retrieve the
information about all track elements and routes, but in Sect. 5 we show how
the knowledge of this convention turns to be useful during model checking
based verification.
Indeed, the validation w.r.t. safety requirements is routinely performed
by the S&V team using model-based testing over the extracted model (see
Sect. 4). Furthermore, formal verification is being currently experimentally
applied, in view of a full adoption in the validation process (see Sect. 5).
4. Model-based Testing
The best practice in model-based testing is to run a test suite on a model
that is derived from the system requirements and the test suite has been
obtained from the model itself (37). In this work, we rather consider an
extended meaning of the term model-based testing : due to the particular
constraints of the considered validation activity, we execute simulations of the
model, using as simulation scenarios the already available test cases intended
for the final system. This differs from canonical model-based testing, but we
wish to maintain also this kind of activity under the umbrella of model-based
testing. We refer to (29) for a more canonical model-based approach to test
interlocking systems, where tests are derived from formal models derived by
system requirements.
In our case, the reasoner engine, considered as the generic application
according to the CENELEC terminology, is taken as already validated, and
hence the focus is on validating the configuration data, that is, the control
table.
For this reason, the model is not derived from the system requirements
but it is directly derived from the binary files, that represent the control table
as loaded on the target, by means of a reverse engineering process.
In the following we describe the test scenarios and the part of the ver-
ification framework which allows to simulate them. Then, we discuss the
obtained results and the assessment process of the framework.
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4.1. Test Scenarios
We show the results of the execution of some sample test scenarios on the
models of three small stations. The models have been built using the process
and algorithm discussed in the previous section. They exhibit the number of
equations, inputs, outputs, gates (only and gates and or gates) and time to
generate the model reported in Table 2. The last column gives, in seconds,
the time needed for extracting the model.
Table 2: Stations Dimensions
Station Equations Inputs Outputs Gates Time
STATION1 2625 717 915 17934 2177
STATION2 2090 351 437 15571 1712
STATION3 3281 490 663 18001 2332
The test scenarios were identified in accordance with signalling engineers.
The test scenarios are written in a tabular format in a spreadsheet where each
test input is marked by the keyword SET followed by the name of the input
and the corresponding value, and each expected output is marked by the
keyword VERIFY followed by the name and the value.
Table 3 shows an example of a test scenario, related to a successful route
request, for route 123. The route includes the points 75 and 42. The scenario
aims to check that a no-collision property and a no-derailment property (see
Sect. 3.5) are satisfied. The former property is verified by checking that the
protection signal 35 is red, the latter by checking that the points are locked
in the desired position.
After all the verifications are completed, the signal 57 authorizing transit
of a train on the route is finally set to green. The interlocking rules for
setting a signal requires a further verification that the signal is confirmed to
be actually set at the desired value.
To simulate the test scenarios a Matlab function, named Digital In-
puts Generator (DIG), has been developed. This function implements three
phases:
1. Each test is provided to the function in a spreadsheet format. The
function reads the spreadsheet and generates a set of digital inputs
corresponding to test inputs (Figure 6).
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Table 3: Example of Test Scenario
Keyword Variable Name Value Description
SET RequestR123 1 Route Request
V ERIFY StatusR123 1 Verify Route Status
SET PosPnt75 0 Command Normal Position
SET PosPnt42 0 Command Normal Position
V ERIFY StatusPnt75 0 Verify Position point
V ERIFY StatusPnt42 0 Verify Position point
SET SignalTL35 0 Set Red Light
V ERIFY StatusTL35 0 Verify Red Light
SET SignalTL57 1 Set Green Light
V ERIFY StatusTL57 1 Verify Green Light
2. The function launches a simulation and Simulink reads the signals (In-
put Digital Signals) and produces the output values of the model (Out-
put Digital Signals).
3. The values obtained by the test simulation are checked with the ex-
pected output reported in the spreadsheet and a report is generated.
In the case the values of digital outputs do not fit the expected outputs
in the spreadsheets, one of the following three cases has occurred:
a. either an error is present in the control table,
b. or an incorrect variable value has been written in the test scenario,
c. or an incorrect station model has been generated2.
4.2. Results
The entire process of importing data from the binaries, modelling the
station and test simulation has been run on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) 3.30GHz,
128GB of RAM machine with Windows 7, 64 bits, operating system.
2Generation of an incorrect station model can occur only due to a bug in the LLDParser
or in the legacy libraries; this possibility actually occurred during the tool testing phase,
triggering appropriate corrections of the affected software components.
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Figure 6: Simulation Framework
In Table 4, we report a comparison between the simulation time for the
test scenarios run for the three stations and the respective execution time on
the target inside of the physical test bed. In each case the number of executed
tests (N. of Test) is presented, together with the mean test target execution
time in seconds (MTTET ), the mean scenario simulation time (MSST ) with
the same test scenarios, and the ratio between MTTET and MSST.
Table 4: Times
Station N. of Tests MTTET MSST Ratio
STATION1 85 808.814 44.794 18.056
STATION2 51 1007.946 54.615 18.455
STATION3 58 1270.769 69.294 18.389
These data show that simulation appears to be around 18 times faster
than testing the target, hence allowing for testing cost reduction.
4.3. The certification process
The certification according to safety guidelines can hardly allow not to
run the tests on the final system. Early simulation of test scenarios can
however avoid hours of target testing rework, due to possible early discovery
of bugs in the description of interlocking rules or of inaccuracies in the test
suite.
The above results have therefore convinced GETS to set up a test frame-
work that includes the following features:
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• extraction of a Simulink model from the implemented control tables;
• adaptation of the incoming test suite to be used as a scenario simulation
for the Simulink model;
• run of the simulation and logging of results, to be eventually compared
for equivalence with the corresponding test run on the target.
The framework has been subject to an external safety assessment process
by an assessor (ASR).
To approve the framework the ASR requested: (1) the description of each
Matlab function, (2) the dependency graph of the Matlab functions and (3)
the user manual of the framework. Moreover, the ASR requested a demo
of the framework; the demo imported and modelled a station and executed
some test scenarios.
After this process the framework has been approved for stations with
up to 5000 equations and it is currently included in the standard validation
process.
4.4. Framework Enhancements
Currently, the framework has been enhanced to consider the interlocking
logics of stations of about 7000/8000 equations, of a railway warehouse with
about 12500 equations and of a so-called multi-station interlocking, control-
ling a line inclusive of some adjacent stations (about 9200 equations).
In the latter case, a compositional method has been implemented for the
model generation. Indeed, the overall line model is obtained by linking sta-
tion models by means of their interfaces at their borders, where the interfaces
consist of variables that give the status of the traffic on the line.
The proven capacity of the framework on larger size interlocking systems
has triggered a supplement of safety assessment, requiring new documenta-
tion to be sent to the ASR, in order to justify its usage of the framework up
to these larger size figures.
5. Model Checking
In recent years model checking techniques have raised the interest of many
railway signalling industries being the most lightweight method, from the
process point of view, and being rather promising in terms of efficiency:
safety properties of an interlocking system are quite directly expressed in
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temporal logic, and their specifications by means of control tables can be
directly formalized (7; 19; 23; 25; 26; 30).
Control tables may indeed play two main roles (not always both present)
in the development of these systems:
• as specifications of the interlocking rules (20; 22), often issued by a
railway infrastructure company;
• as an implementation means, when they come encoded in some exe-
cutable language, that may be either proprietary or standard, as is the
case for ladder diagrams.
In the first case, verification of control tables may address self consistency
of the specification, or correctness of the implementation w.r.t. the specifi-
cation, while in the second case it may be focused on the check of safety
properties (expressed for example in a temporal logic) on the implementa-
tion. Typical issues of any of these verification tasks is the combinatorial
state space explosion problem, due to the high number of boolean variables
involved, and the choice of how to express control tables in a language suit-
able for the verification tool adopted.
The first applications of model checking have therefore addressed portions
of an interlocking system (3; 18); but even recent works (17; 38) show that
routine verification of interlocking designs for large stations is still a challenge
for model checkers, although specific optimizations can help (38).
5.1. Satisfability Problem for Interlocking Systems
A recent effort has collected up-to-date reports about interlocking verifi-
cation (7; 19; 25; 26). Notwithstanding their different verification aims, one
point in common to these works is the use of SAT-based model checking,
which appears to be more promising due to the native boolean coding of the
control tables.
Indeed, according to the representation given in Sect. 3.1 of the set of
boolean equations we can call x˜i, y˜i the vectors of values taken by such vari-
ables in successive executions. From the equations we can define F (x˜i, x˜i+1, y˜i)
as a boolean function that is true iff x˜i+1 = f(x˜i, y˜i), representing one ex-
ecution of the equations. Let Init(x˜) be a predicate which is true for the
initial vector value of state and output variables. If P (x˜) is a predicate telling
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that a desired (safety) property is verified by the vector x˜, then the following
expression:
Φ(k) = Init(x˜) ∧
k−1∧
i=0
F (x˜i, x˜i+1, y˜i) ∧
k∨
i=0
∼ P (x˜i)
is a boolean formula that tells that P is not true for the state/output vector
for some of the first k execution cycles.
According to the Bounded Model Checking (BMC) principles (4), using
a SAT-solver to find a satisfying assignment to the boolean variables ends up
either in unsatisfiability, which means that the property is satisfied by the
first k execution cycles, or in an assignment that can be used as a counterex-
ample for P , in particular showing a k-long sequence of input vectors that
cause the safety problem with P .
SAT-based Bounded Model Checking can be complemented by k-induction
(32; 12) to show satisfiability beyond the set bounds, and may be made more
efficient by employing SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theory) solvers (1).
These techniques are applied indeed in commercial solutions for the pro-
duction of interlocking software, such as Prover Technology’s Ilock (24), that
includes formal proof of safety conditions as well, by means of a SAT solv-
ing engine. Industrial acceptance of such “black-box” solutions is however
sometimes hindered by the fear of vendor lock-in phenomena and by the loss
of control over the production process.
In our case, however, the interlocking design process is not an issue: the
S&V team receives already encoded control tables in a target machine, and
the extracted Simulink model is therefore the input to the model checking
activity.
The clear preference of GETS towards commercial tools, together with the
natural integration with Simulink and its SAT-solving engine has suggested
the adoption of Matlab Design Verifier (33).
Notwithstanding the interesting performances of Design Verifier on large
models, state explosion on thousands of equations is overwhelming. Hence,
strategies to contain the state space are eagerly needed.
5.2. Environment assumptions and Slicing
We can observe that the state space of a model of an interlocking system
depends on the modelling of its environment as well. For example, the study
of (17) made no assumption whatsoever on the environment: the study was
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aimed at finding the limits of verification of a completely unconstrained set of
boolean equations, with little attention to realism of the equations set w.r.t.
actual interlocking rules. The particularly negative outcomes of that work
in terms of size of tractable interlockings were mostly due to the absence of
constraints on the external environment, that is to the assumption that the
system is open to any behaviour of the environment.
Most works on formal verification of interlocking systems do instead make
assumptions on the behaviour of the environment, in order to constrain the
state space, but also because some verification frameworks can only deal
with a closed system. Such assumptions may take the form of an explicit
model of the environment: for example, trains moving on the controlled track
layout are also modelled, and the trains often obey to some reasonableness
constraint, such as trains moving in only one direction, appearing in the
layout only at its borders, respecting signals, and so on. Such constraints
enforce only particular sequences of events (e.g. track occupancy events) to
be possible inputs for the interlocking systems, and consequently limit the
state space explosion typical of when considering a fully open environment.
It is then a matter of the safety assessment process to demonstrate that
the properties proved under given assumptions are maintained in any real
situation due to the reasonableness of the environment. For example, it is
possible in many cases to show that modelling two trains is enough to cover
cases with more trains present in the track layout (14; 31).
Such assumptions in general refer to local properties, that is, for example,
no-derailment on a point is scarcely related to the location of a distant point
on a parallel track. To be more precise, locality is implied by the definition of
routes, that is, the set of contiguous track elements that need to be granted
for a given train movement: the routes insisting on a given track element
define the elements that may be directly related to the status of the given
element. Locality given by the topological layout of the controlled systems
has been used in (38; 39; 40) to define domain-oriented optimizations of the
variable ordering in a BDD-based verification.
Locality can be used also for slicing, as suggested in (17) and (25). The
idea is to consider only the portion of the model that has influence on the
property to be verified, by a topological selection of interested track elements:
this allows for a much more efficient verification, at the price of repeating
the verification activity for each extracted slice and of showing that verifying
slices does implies the satisfaction of desired properties for the whole system.
Extracting a slice of the model implies to make assumptions on the environ-
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ment of the slice: either an open, unconstrained environment, or constrained
by reasonableness assumptions. Verification of a slice is targeted therefore
to the satisfaction of local properties of the slices, under the assumptions
(possibly none) given for the environment of the slice. It is therefore needed
to show that the satisfaction of local properties under the given environment
assumptions imply the satisfaction of global properties of interest.
Notice that in our case the term slicing gets a slightly different meaning
with respect to the consolidated definition of program slicing (36). As in
program slicing, the slice is built, starting from a set of variables, by con-
sidering only those statements (in our case, equations) whose execution may
affect the value of variables. While in program slicing this just removes irrel-
evant steps, producing a precise approximation of the behaviour, in this case
it also removes references to parts of the external environment by removing
tout-court some constraints on it, leading to an over-approximation of the
behaviour. So, we use the term slicing to refer to the syntactic technique to
produce a property-preserving abstraction of the system.
We have already described in Sect. 3.5 the naming conventions that hold
for variables in our equations: each track element n, where n is a unique
identifying number, is associated to several variables whose name contains
the number n; for example ND35 and NC11-77. This guides the extraction of
a slice. Consider for example a no-derailment property that can be expressed
as: by no way point 35 can move while track circuit 18 is occupied. A slice can
be built by considering only the equations that include variables whose name
contains 35 and 18. All the other variables in the right hand of the equations
are considered as free variables, and hence constitute the environment of
the slice, either open or constrained by some reasonableness assumptions. If
it comes out that the verification of the property on the slice/environment
pair does not give a clearly positive answer, the pair should be refined in a
successive step, giving rise to an iterative verification process.
This reasoning can be extended to any safety property. Consider a safety
property φ that tells that a dangerous situation referring to the status of
some elements {t1, t2, . . . tn} is never reached. Let us build the smallest slice
M ′ selecting only the equations with those variables {x1, x2, . . . xm} that in
their identifiers refer to {t1, t2, . . . tn}. Let us call {y1, y2, . . . yp} all the other
variables of the selected equations. In this slice all the equations assigning
a value not depending from any xi to a variable yj is omitted. The values
taken by the yj variables are not defined, hence they can be considered as part
of the fully open environment. The states reachable by executing the slice
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M ′ with any input are a superset of the states reachable when we add any
constraint to the values taken by the yj variables (e.g., by adding equations
not present in M ′, or constraining the environment). Hence, if M ′ |= φ,
then the property is satisfied by the whole equation system M . Otherwise, a
counterexample for M ′ |= φ may tell either that the property is not satisfied
at all by M , or that M ′ has too few equations, or that the environment is
not sufficiently constrained.
5.3. CEGAR-like verification process
In (6) we have proposed an iterative verification process inspired by the
CEGAR (CounterExample Guided Abstraction Refinement) paradigm (11),
in which the analysis of counterexamples drives the refinement of the model
for a further verification cycle. the process is represented in Fig. 7.
Figure 7: CEGAR-like verification loop
The initial slice M ′ is extracted from the input model M on the basis
of the required property P , focusing on the set of track elements or routes,
distinguished by a unique numeric identifier, that are referred by P . Hence
the slice is constituted by the equations that refer to variables having those
numbers in their identifier. All the other variables in the right hand side of
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the equations are considered as free variables, and hence constitute the fully
open environment of the slice.
If the property P is not verified, a counterexample CE is generated: the
counterexample is examined in order to refine the slice or its environment to
remove the occurrence of spurious counterexamples (model refinement step).
This step can exploit different techniques, depending on the results of the
analysis conducted on CE. The counterexample analysis is strictly depen-
dent on the functional and safety aspects of system at hand, and hence
requires some knowledge of the produced system: it is therefore a mostly
manual analysis requiring help from signal engineers.
First of all, the analyst can decide that CE is actually related to some
fault. The verification process can continue after storing the faulty scenario.
The data that have produced the counterexample are then excluded from the
next verification step, typically by constraining the environment by means
of the negation of CE.
In the case CE is not considered to exhibit a fault in the model, the
analyst has to distinguish counterexamples that can be clearly decided to be
infeasible due to, e.g., physical constraints, from those that may be possibly
unfeasible due to the actual behaviour of the environment of the slice, which
is constituted by the equations excluded from the slice. In the first case, it is
likely that the counterexample is generated by an unfeasible combination of
values of input variables, while in the second case it is due to the assumption
of unconstrained behaviour of adjacent elements, that is, by an unfeasible
combination of values of latch variables that are assigned by equations which
have been excluded from the slice.
In the first case the analysis continues on the same slice, by excluding
the input data that has produced CE, while in the second case the slice is
considered too small to continue the verification process, and is augmented
by bringing in all the equations that contain free variables of the M ′ slice3.
Recall that at the first step the free variables of M ′ are those that do not
contain the identifiers of the track elements on which the slide was first built:
hence this step enlarges the scope of the considered slice to some other track
elements, that with high probability are physically adjacent to the original
ones due to the locality principles.
3This step can be automated, although in the experience reported in Sect. 5.4 it has
been performed manually.
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Usually the property is invariant w.r.t. the enlarging of the scope of
the slice, since it refers to variables that are still part of equations in the
augmented slice. In some cases, it might be needed to refine the property for
consistency with the slicing mechanism. In this case, the refined property P ′
to be used in the next verification step should be such that augment(M ′) |=
P ′ implies that M satisfies P when embedded in its proper environment.
The model refinement cycle terminates when the property is verified (pos-
sibly trivially because the model has become over-constrained): at that point
the possible faulty counterexamples stored during the process can be subject
to further analysis in order to plan corrective action or to support fault anal-
ysis conducted at the system level.
We finally note that the presented process is independent from the model
checking tool used: in the following we discuss some example verification
results achieved with Design Verifier.
5.4. Verification with Design Verifier
5.4.1. No-derailment property
We show in the following some example verifications performed on computer-
based interlocking subsystems that control small railway stations. The entire
process of importing data production binary files, modelling the station and
proving the properties has been run on a DELL XPS L501X 2.67GHz, 4GB
of RAM machine with Windows 7, 64 bits, operating system.
In the first case, the subsystem has 1038 equations, 321 inputs and 470
outputs; each equation can have from one input to a maximum of 25 inputs.
The size of the model is therefore rather large, and slicing is therefore consid-
ered according to the iterative process defined in section 5.3. The verification
considers a no-derailment property ND35 for a chosen point, numbered 35
(referring to the fragment of track layout represented in Fig. 9). The prop-
erty is defined as:
Property ND35
Under the preconditions (which are considered to characterize the state
in which the route is granted for the passage of a train):
1. A route request for the route 11, that includes point 35, has been re-
ceived.
2. In accordance with the route request the points belonging to the route
are in the correct position.
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3. The route is reserved.
the point 35, in the case a movement request, MR35, is received, must not
move either in normal position, NPM35, or in reverse position, RPM35.
The verification with Design Verifier requires the property ND35 to be
expressed as a Simulink “observer”, as shown in Fig 8.
Figure 8: Representation of the property ND35 in Simulink
According to the process described in Section 5.3, we generate the small-
est slice of the computer-based interlocking subsystem to prove the property
ND35 ; this slice includes all the equations referring to variables whose iden-
tifier contains the number 35: the slice has 16 equations and 70 inputs. The
slice also assumes that track circuits 18 and 23 (which are shared by route
11 and 82) are initially not occupied.
Figure 9: Fragment of station plan for the no-derailment property
The verification on Slice1 has generated 15 counterexamples (with 15
CEGAR iterations) before satisfying the property. Each counterexample has
been excluded with the introduction of an environment assumption on input
variables. When the property was satisfied, the analysis of the environ-
ment assumptions, introduced by the previous generated counterexamples,
has shown these other preconditions:
a. No other route request must have been received.
b. The route reservation announces to the adjacent station on the route
the next arrival of a train, and the station acknowledges this announce-
ment: this acknowledgement must be already received.
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This consideration has suggested that enlarging the slices as recommended
in the iterative process would have soon given better results. Indeed, we have
performed such enlargement (Slice2) that has allowed us to include such pre-
conditions in the slice itself. The new slice contains all the equations that
control the track circuits 17, 18, 42 and 78; hence, the boundary of the slice
towards the environment has moved from track circuit 18 to track circuit
23, and so have done the related assumptions. The verification of the same
property for this slice has immediately produced no counterexamples.
In order to test the sensitiveness of the approach to timing issues, we
have included in Slice3 a timer equation present in the original model, but
which was not included in Slice2. The duration of the timer in the model
is set to 5 seconds, while the DV parameter called simulation step is 150
milliseconds: modelling the timer amounts to wait for a sufficient number
of simulation steps. With this value, the verification was not concluded in
reasonable time (presumably, the property was satisfied, but DV was not
able to complete the search for non-existing counterexamples) because it
needed too many simulation steps, which increase the state space size beyond
reasonable limits. To achieve the verification of the property we adopted
a different time scale, by changing the simulation step to half a second,
separately checking that the chosen different time scale was still compatible
with the functional behaviour of the slice. The property is verified with
the compressed time scale, and the computation time has been dramatically
decreased, well beyond expectations.
In Table 5 we report for each slice the number of equations and the number
of free inputs, the number of counterexamples produced before proving the
property, the simulation step used and the time taken by Design Verifier to
complete a single step of the verification loop.
Table 5: Verification Results
Slice Equations Inputs Counterex.
Simul.
Step
(ms)
Time (sec)
Slice1 16 42 15 150 60.0
Slice2 64 94 0 150 104.0
Slice3 65 94 0 500 46.0
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5.4.2. No-collision property
We show the verification of a no-collision property as well, NC11-77,
which refers this time to the route requests for the routes 11 and 77 on the
same track layout fragment (see Fig. 11):
Property NC11-77
Under the preconditions:
1. A route request for the route 11 has been received.
2. The route is reserved.
the route request for the conflict route 77 must not be accepted.
The verification with Design Verifier requires the property NC11-77 to
be expressed as a Simulink observer, as shown in Fig 10.
Figure 10: Representation of the property NC11-77 in Simulink
A different slice, with 29 equations, has been modelled to prove the prop-
erty NC11-77, which has been verified without producing any counterexample
in about 30 seconds.
Figure 11: Fragment of station plan for the no-collision property
5.4.3. Automatic Cancellation
In the end, we show the verification of a more complex property regard-
ing the automatic cancellation feature, (also known as sequential release(28))
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that releases an element in a reserved route as soon as the train has passed
it. Safety for automatic cancellation is guaranteed when in no way the can-
cellation is activated before the train has passed the relevant elements. The
examined property, that refers high level variables (that is, variables which
encode high level commands and situations, not the status of track elements)
is defined for route 72 as:
Property AutomCanc
Under the preconditions (which are considered to characterize the state
in which a train is going to occupy a route granted for it):
• a route request for the route 72 has been received and the route is
reserved (precondition represented by the variable RR72);
• a train is approaching the entering track of the route (precondition
defined as an environment assumption).
then in no case the automatic cancellation of the route should be activated
(AC72).
The Simulink observer for the property is elementary, as shown in Fig 12.
Figure 12: Observer for the property AutomCanc
In the verification of this property we have experimented the use of the
Mathworks Model Slicer toolbox. Model Slicer performs a slicing on the
Simulink model, starting from the output variables that are referred to in
the property, and navigating backwards the model data flows to retrieve all
the Simulink blocks influencing the property. We call in the following a slice
generated by Model Slicer as property-driven, while slicing obtained through
looking at variable identifiers as described in Sect. 5.2 is called layout-driven.
It turns out that the layout-driven slice is a sub-model of the property-driven
slice, because it does not transitively considers other variables influencing the
property (that are considered as open environment), but only the ones with
the related identifiers: only through a model refinement step the slice is
gradually enlarged to eventually coincide with the property-driven one. The
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initial model had 930 equation and the Model Slicer generated a property-
driven slice (Slice1) with 290 equations. The layout-driven slice (Slice2) has
only 3 equations and is represented in Figure 13).
Figure 13: Minimal slice to prove AutomCanc
A first counterexample has been generated by Design Verifier for both
slices. The signalling engineers classified these counterexamples as unfeasible
and hence spurious, since the counterexamples showed a train which moved
in a route in conflict with route 72, and no-collision was already proved for
the two routes.
After the environment has been modified to exclude that counterexample, a
further counterexample has been generated, as shown in Table 6, exhibiting
an (unexpected) occupation in sequence of the point 35 and track circuit
18 (see Fig. 14), that does not prevent automatic cancellation to be issued.
Signalling engineers have considered that such an unexpected occupation is
possible in some failure cases, and issuing automatic cancellation in such
cases is an actual safety threat which had not been detected during previous
testing activity, hence triggering a corrective action on the control tables.
In Table 7 we show the metrics (number of equations and inputs) of the
slices for this property and the time to find out the counterexample, that
indicates that the (domain-specific) layout-driven slicing mechanism is more
efficient in giving the same results.
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Table 6: Counterexample
Step 1 2
TC35 0 0
TC18 1 0
Figure 14: Unexpected occupation counterexample
5.5. Performance of Design Verifier
To evaluate the performance gain obtained by slicing, we report in Ta-
ble 8 the results related to the verification of the ND35 property on slices
of growing size. Fig. 15 represents the actual station plan (with some ab-
straction from the real one for confidentiality reasons): the station is ac-
tually controlled by three computer-based interlocking subsystems (named
CIS1, CIS2, CIS3), on which the set of equations constituting the station
logic has been split. Inside the area controlled by CIS2, we can recognize
the fragment of the layout that we have considered above: starting from
Slice1, we can iteratively apply the process used above to augment it to
Slice2, until the border of CIS2 is reached: it can be seen that the slice
we obtain, Slicemax, will contain only some of the equations of CIS2. We
consider hence proving the ND35 property on Slicemax, on the whole set
of equations of CIS2, and on the whole station logic, expecting that it is
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Table 7: Performance of DV on property AutCanc
Slice Equations Inputs Time (sec.)
Slice1 290 2 281
Slice2 3 2 3
verified on all these models, for the locality properties and for the fact that
it has been verified by Slice2.
Figure 15: The complete example station plan
The ND35 property is proved correct for Slicemax in about 13 minutes
and for CIS2 in about 2 hours and 45 minutes (see Table 8). The proof of this
property on the whole station model raised unresolved model size problems
right at the start of the proof.
Slicing is hence vital for the actual application of automated formal ver-
ification to interlocking systems controlling medium to large sized stations.
5.5.1. Verification Depth
The above results have been obtained with the default value of 20 simula-
tion steps for the Design Verifier parameter, called violation steps. This pa-
rameter indicates the depth of the state space (13) computed by the Bounded
Model Checker; this means the Bounder Model Checker computes with max-
imum depth of 21 states.
We occasionally used the strategy described in the Design Verifier User
Guide aiming at proving a property for greater depth values:
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Table 8: Verification Results on Slicemax, single CIS and the entire station
Slice Equations
Free
Inputs
Counterex.
Sim.
Step
(ms)
Time
(sec)
Slicemax 237 128 0 500 775.0
CIS2 1608 266 0 500 9844.0
STATION 2625 602 - 500 -
• Set the Strategy parameter to Prove and set the Maximum Analysis
Time parameter to 5-10 minutes.
• Set the Strategy parameter to FindViolation and set Maximum Viola-
tion Steps parameter to 4,5 or 6 steps.
• If you do not find any short counterexample:
– increase the bound for Maximum Violation Steps (we increased it
to 30, a value that it has been shown sufficient for our purposes).
– switch back to Prove strategy, and use a longer time limit, such
as several hours, to find long counterexamples.
5.5.2. Alternative model extraction possibilities
The proprietary nature of Design Verifier does not allow to tune its SAT-
solving procedures for improving the verification performance. The only
opportunity left to optimize verification was trying to use different modelling
strategies, and comparing their verification performance. We have considered
the three alternatives given by Simulink to express boolean functions:
• Simulink logical gates blocks, as described in previous section;
• Simulink blocks, called combinatorial logic, which explicitely express,
for each equation, its complete truth table.
• Stateflow truth tables (34), that allow to define a minimal truth table
by means of don’t care conditions.
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However, we have soon realized that the modelling by means of combina-
torial logic blocks was not feasible due to the required full definition of the
truth table; indeed, for a typical station, (with several equations with more
than 20 input variables), a memory overflow even occurred already during
the model extraction phase with this option. We have therefore compared
the other two alternatives. In the conducted experiments, a no-derailment
property and a no-collision property were considered. For both, property
proving is from 1.5 to 3 times faster on the models with logical gates than
on the models with Stateflow truth tables.
Apparently, starting from logical gates the internal translation of Design
Verifier yields a more efficient representation in terms of satisfying assignment
problem. So the initial choice has been confirmed as the best one, given the
choice of the tool.
6. Conclusions
The high costs of the validation process of an interlocking system are due
to the fact that the system under test is very complex and it is necessary to
build a proper test-bench where the real interlocking system is reproduced.
We have reported over the industrial application of model-based test-
ing techniques that employ a model extraction procedure. The extraction
procedure generates a Simulink model that mimics the behaviour of the pro-
duction target system, ruled by the implemented control tables: simulating
established test suites on such a model can hardly avoid the final, lengthy val-
idation tests on the target, due to the demanding requirements of EN50128
standard, but it has a twofold advantage: it allows for early discovery of er-
rors in the control tables or of inaccuracies in the test suites and it introduces
a form of redundancy with diversity in the validation process.
The first results have convinced GETS to adopt this procedure to test the
next interlocking systems. Indeed, simulation appears to be around 18 times
faster than testing the target, so that running the foreseen test scenarios
in advance on the extracted models can spare future rework on the anyway
necessary tests conducted on the target.
We have then shown how the same extracted model can be subject to
formal verification, by means of Design Verifier, a commercial model checker
based on a SAT-solver; an iterative verification process implementing slicing
and CEGAR-like techniques has been defined to address the typical com-
plexity of this application domain.
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Further experience with the application of model checking techniques is
needed before they can be accepted in the standard validation process in place
of testing. The preliminary analysis shown in this paper has left several open
issues to be addressed in future work.
• Confidence on the model-checking results: to be actually used for cer-
tification purposes in place of testing, the used tool should in principle
be demonstrated not to miss any error in the model;
• Proprietary nature of the verification tool, that has not allowed to cus-
tomize the verification strategy beyond those it natively provides; in
particular the tuning of the verification depth has to be better anal-
ysed.
Coupled with the previous observation, this one points to the paral-
lel usage of a different model checker, relaxing the initial constraints
set by the industrial partner on the choice of the tool. Indeed, the
proposed iterative verification process is actually independent from the
particular model checker used, and we have currently started to exploit
such independence to create a framework that extracts the model in
an intermediate format, suitable for a further translation to different
model formats. NuSMV (10) is currently experimented as a target
model-checker for such translation.
• Sensitiveness of the verification process to timing issues: it has yet to be
understood whether the time scale compression techniques previously
shown can be generally applied to other models including timers.
• Relations between the used variables identifier convention and the ac-
tual topology of the track layout, that need to be systematically iden-
tified, so that a more efficient automated slicing mechanism can be
defined, in order to produce a more precise approximation to reduce
the number of the CEGAR cycle iterations.
The developed framework and approach has been designed for an ad hoc
industrial environment, hence it cannot be ported as it is to other inter-
locking producers that follow different development processes. However, we
believe that the lessons learned by this experience can be useful to other
manufacturers, as well as to other production contexts. In particular, we
have observed that the iterative verification approach, with its incremental
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nature, has helped the verifier to acquire a step-by-step increasing confidence
on the system’s behaviour, with targeted interactions with signal engineers.
This is expected to be an added value when the approach is adopted within
an independent validation division, that (often on purpose, due to the in-
dependence constraints) has not the detailed, low-level, knowledge on the
product available.
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